Competitor Spotlight · built for Upbound Group
Progressive Leasing: Acima’s mirror — and the pure-play it just overtook
Progressive Leasing (NYSE: PRG) is the closest thing Acima has to a twin: the same virtual lease-to-own model, the same non-prime customer, the same ~2× cost-to-own. That makes it the cleanest head-to-head in the portfolio — and in FY2025, Acima passed it. The honest version of that story is the valuable one.
Sourcing discipline. Every figure is public and cited (PROG IR, SEC filings, FTC, earnings calls). Where the popular narrative overstates the case (e.g. the ±8.6% “share transfer”), the copy says so. Verified June 2026; market figures move daily.
At a glance
A shrinking core, a cash-returning balance sheet, and a regulatory scar.
The overtaking
Acima passed Progressive Leasing on GMV in FY2025.
In FY2024 Progressive Leasing’s book ($1.93B) was larger than Acima’s ($1.85B). In FY2025 Acima grew +8.6% to $2.01B while Progressive fell −8.6% to $1.76B — and Acima became the larger virtual-LTO book. Honest caveat: the ±8.6% symmetry is coincidence, and Progressive’s decline is mostly idiosyncratic (the Big Lots bankruptcy ~$40M + ~$30M of self-imposed decisioning tightening). The right read is “Acima out-executed an impaired rival,” not “poached its customers.” Upbound 10-K · PROG 10-K · PROG Q4 call
Head-to-head: Progressive vs Acima
The purest mirror — note the loss-rate row.
| Progressive Leasing | Acima (Upbound) | |
|---|---|---|
| Parent | PROG Holdings (NYSE: PRG) | Upbound Group (NASDAQ: UPBD) |
| Model | Virtual LTO through POS partners (no stores) | Virtual LTO with a heavier direct-to-consumer / marketplace tilt |
| Customer | Near-prime / subprime | Subprime; underwritten on income + bank data |
| FY2024 GMV | $1.93B (larger) | $1.85B |
| FY2025 GMV | $1.76B (−8.6%) | $2.01B (+8.6%) — overtook |
| Loss rate | ~7.6% of revenue | ~9.5% of revenue (growth carries more risk) |
| Channel exposure | Top-10 partners = 77% of revenue | Lower single-partner exposure via DTC tilt |
The same mechanism on both sides — provider buys the good, leases it to a non-prime customer, owns it until paid off, with a 90-day early-buyout window. The differences are corporate and channel, plus the loss/growth trade-off.
The $175M FTC settlement
The cautionary tale for the entire lease-to-own category.
$175 million — April 2020
Progressive Leasing (then under Aaron’s, Inc.) settled FTC charges that it deceived consumers about price. The FTC found consumers were told plans were “same as cash” or “no interest,” yet “frequently paid approximately twice the sticker price if they made all scheduled payments” — with the true cost buried behind a non-descript “Additional Lease Details” dropdown. More than 15,000 complaints landed in a single 15-month window.
The FTC later distributed over $172M to 2M+ consumers (~$85 each). The settlement requires clear-and-conspicuous total-cost-to-own disclosure and express informed consent before billing.
This is the spine of the “disguised high-cost credit” risk that hangs over the entire lease-to-own category — Acima included. The model’s economics (revenue ≈ the merchandise value again) live one regulatory reinterpretation away from being treated as credit under TILA. State AGs are already testing that theory.
Beyond the core
PROG is diversifying away from a flat LTO book.
Progressive Leasing is ~96% of PROG’s revenue today, but the company is visibly diversifying: BNPL, employer payroll-deduction, and cash advance. Read it as a hedge against a core LTO book that has stopped growing.
Four (BNPL)
PROG’s pay-in-4 platform — triple-digit GMV growth for nine straight quarters. The growth engine outside the shrinking core.
Purchasing Power
Employer-sponsored purchase via payroll deduction — acquired Jan 2026, guided to ~$680–730M revenue. A new, captive distribution channel.
MoneyApp
A direct-to-consumer cash-advance app — PROG’s toe into Dave/Brigit’s lane (and the target of a TILA class action).
Vive Financial
Second-look revolving credit — divested in Oct 2025. PROG is concentrating, not sprawling.
Note the spin-off direction: PROG Holdings is the continuing Progressive Leasing entity; it spun off the Aaron’s stores in Dec 2020. Spin-off ↗
What it means for Upbound
An execution win — claimed precisely.
Acima is out-executing its closest mirror
Same model, same customer, same ~2× cost-to-own — and Acima just became the larger book. That’s a genuine execution win worth claiming. Claim it precisely: Acima grew through a period when its purest rival was impaired by a partner bankruptcy and its own tightening.
But the win comes with more risk on the books
Acima’s ~9.5% loss rate runs above Progressive’s ~7.6%. The faster, more DTC funnel takes more credit risk to grow. The honest scorecard pairs the GMV win with the loss-rate gap — and makes closing that gap a priority.
The whole category sits on a regulatory floor
Progressive’s $175M FTC settlement is the cautionary tale, and the “disguised credit” theory is live across LTO (a multistate probe has touched Acima itself). The bull case on Acima’s execution rests on a category-wide regulatory floor that applies to both — get ahead of disclosure, don’t wait for the enforcement.
Watch the consolidation
Katapult is merging with Aaron’s and CCF into a >$4B-revenue LTO competitor (expected Q2 2026), and PROG is diversifying into BNPL and cash advance. The pure-play LTO field is reshaping around Acima — a competitive-intelligence story worth tracking live.
What could slow it — the bear case
For Progressive, and the risks the category shares.
- GMV decline: −8.6% in FY2025, −2.2% in Q1 2026. Improving, but the turnaround depends on lapping Big Lots and reversing decisioning tightening.
- Retail-partner concentration: top-10 partners = 77% of revenue. Big Lots (2024) drove the FY2025 decline; American Signature / Value City (Nov 2025) is the next headwind. This is the structural vulnerability Acima’s DTC tilt partly sidesteps.
- Regulatory / “disguised credit”: the 2020 FTC $175M settlement plus live state-AG activity treating LTO as credit (and a TILA class action against MoneyApp).
- Competition: Acima (now larger), Katapult + Aaron’s + CCF merging into a >$4B LTO player, and BNPL moving down-market into subprime.
- Consumer credit cycle: sub-650 FICO exposure makes write-offs the barometer (Progressive ran 7.6% of leasing revenue in Q4’25, within its 6–8% target).
So what for Upbound
The recommendation
- Claim the overtaking — precisely. Acima becoming the larger virtual-LTO book is a real win, but frame it as out-executing an impaired rival, not stealing share. Precision is the credential.
- Pair every GMV claim with the loss-rate gap. Acima’s growth carries ~190 bps more loss than Progressive’s. The defensible story is growth-with-discipline; make closing the gap an explicit goal.
- Get ahead of the disclosure question. Progressive’s FTC settlement shows exactly where LTO is exposed. Clear total-cost-to-own disclosure is a CX and reputation win before it’s a compliance one.
- Track the consolidation as a standing item. Katapult/Aaron’s/CCF and PROG’s diversification are reshaping the field. A live competitive tracker — not an annual deck — keeps Strategy ahead of it.
Built by Paul Brown from PROG’s public filings and the FTC record — the closing piece of the competitor-spotlight set. Acima vs Progressive is the cleanest mirror in the field, and the most honest way to show it is the most persuasive.